
TRUE OR FALSE, PROCESS OR PROCEDURE:
PARRHĒSIA AND A CONSIDERATION OF HUMANISM,
SUBJECTIVITY, AND ETHICS WITHIN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

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This paper seeks to examine ethics, humanism, and the concept of *parrhēsia* ($\pi\alpha\rho\eta\varsigma\iota\alpha$) in the context of educational research.¹ More specifically, it surveys Foucault's lectures on ethics to explore a framework for educational research that disrupts subjectivity and traditional forms of humanism while retaining a relational conception of ethics. Within research in education, expertise is becoming narrowly defined and “promotes values of distance, fixity, and procedural ways of knowing and coming to know.”² Proceduralization increasingly governs the conduct and ethics of educational research. There is a need to search for alternative concepts and approaches to ethical engagement; “new and unexpected kinds of relationships” that require risk, courage, critique, and self-reflexive practices.³

The concept of *parrhēsia* has received some scholarly attention in the development of free speech arguments.⁴ However, its potential role in and connection to education and educational research are limited to a few key works.⁵ We seek to contribute to this emerging discussion by arguing that the concept of *parrhēsia* offers the potential to contemplate engagement outside one's subjectivity as we, educational researchers, think about and conduct our studies. Our specific intent is to create a dialogical space between ethics, humanism and *parrhēsia* by building on earlier explorations of and extending our thinking about *parrhēsia*.⁶ We invite subsequent discussions to problematize “normalizing

¹ The authors would like to acknowledge the many valuable insights and suggestions made by Phil Boltz, Ball State University. These insights and suggestions were instrumental in the conceptualization of this paper.

² Aaron M. Kuntz, *The Responsible Methodologist: Inquiry, Truth-Telling, and Social Justice* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, Inc., 2015), 12.

³ Greg Dimitriadis, *Critical Dispositions: Evidence and Expertise in Education* (New York: Routledge, 2012), vii.

⁴ David Colclough, “Parrhesia: The Rhetoric of Free Speech in Early Modern England,” *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 17, no. 2 (1999).

⁵ Three notable exceptions are: Kerry Burch, “Parrhesia as a Principle of Democratic Pedagogy,” *Philosophical Studies in Education* 40 (2009); Michael A. Peters, “Truth-Telling as an Educational Practice of the Self: Foucault, Parrhesia and the Ethics of Subjectivity,” *Oxford Review of Education* 29, no. 2 (2003); and, Kuntz, *The Responsible Methodologist*.

⁶ Burch, “Parrhesia as a Principle.”

rationales” by reflecting on research ethics and exploring the notion of intersection within our practices.⁷

PARRHĒSIA AND THE ETHICS OF TRUTH-TELLING

As noted, the majority of contemporary explorations of parrhēsia have occurred in the context of free speech arguments.⁸ The concept was known in ancient philosophy, but remains under-examined in contemporary scholarly discussions about discourse, knowledge, truth, and ethics.⁹ Historically, parrhēsia meant to open one’s heart and mind completely to other people through his or her discourse.¹⁰ Over time the concept came to mean to be direct and not hide one’s beliefs or intended meaning in rhetoric. It began to signify a principle of truth-telling associated with transforming the soul of an individual, and had political and democratic dimensions.¹¹ Parrhēsia meant to engage socially and politically as a consequence of integrity of heart.¹² It meant to courageously say truthful things that are useful for all to hear.¹³

Foucault’s examination of parrhēsia began with a series of lectures.¹⁴ His study was undertaken with the intent of better understanding the ethical implications of how individuals establish relationships with others. He discovered that parrhēsia involves relationships with others that help guide one to take stock in oneself.¹⁵

In the corpus of Foucault’s work, the production of knowledge is explicitly connected to the function of power. This connection is often seen as devoid of human agency. Parrhēsia, in turn, links knowledge transmission and augmentation of internal processes, such as reasoning, to a relational component (interaction and dialogue).¹⁶ Foucault noted that parrhēsia did not entail “a requirement of solitude, but a real social practice” as an “intensifier of social

⁷ Patti Lather, “Getting Lost: Feminist Efforts toward a Double(D) Science,” *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 30, no. 1 (2009).

⁸ Colclough, “Rhetoric of Free Speech.”

⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (Hampshire, UK: Picador, 2011), 344.

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 12.

¹¹ Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, 65.

¹² Ibid., 326.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); *The Courage of Truth*.

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 536.

¹⁶ This stands in contrast to Arendt’s notion on mental structures as internalized. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

relations.”¹⁷ His central argument was that with parrhēsia, being occupied with oneself and political activities are connected.¹⁸ Hence, parrhēsia, as Kerry Burch argued, “can help facilitate the development of both intellectual courage and democracy as a way of life.”¹⁹ This facilitation, however, requires contemplation of subjectivity and truth.

In his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault began to examine the historical formation of relations between *subject* and *truth*,²⁰ which was built on his analysis of forms of knowledge associated with dividing techniques.²¹ Initially, this involved a consideration of *care of the self* that later evolved into the focus on parrhēsia, which can be understood as a shift from care of the self to *care of others*. Put differently, care of the self was an essential component of individual freedom, whereas care of the other was an essential component of democracy. Foucault concludes that in Greek society taking care of the self did not presuppose the return to a lost origin, but the emergence of a distinct *nature*, though one that was not originally given to us.²² This requires a relationship with someone who guides our self-understanding through dialogue.

Self-knowledge is often interwoven in a series of subjectivities ingrained in concepts and beliefs. These beliefs are also mediated through language and communication.²³ Parrhēsia, which seeks to challenge these beliefs, does not come from a strategy of demonstration. It is associated with truth-telling and not a form of persuasion.²⁴ Parrhēsia seeks to recognize the limits of knowledge, and emphasizes a relational component and a sustained critique of the “historical present.”²⁵ It is a concept appropriate for an abandonment of ethics based in religion and the rejection of morality inscribed

¹⁷ Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 537.

¹⁸ Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 26.

¹⁹ Burch, “Parrhesia as a Principle,” 71.

²⁰ Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 2.

²¹ Michel Foucault, *The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France 1972–1973*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 266.

²² Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*.

²³ Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Derrida states, “what is a text, and what must the psyche be if it can be represented by a text? For if there is neither machine nor text without psychical origin, there is no domain of the psychic without text,” 250.

²⁴ Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, 53.

²⁵ Kuntz, *The Responsible Methodologist*, 102.

in legal systems dictating how we conduct our personal and private lives, which could be extended to the context of research.²⁶

Foucault saw that the *care of self* couldn't be a spontaneous attitude or natural movement of subjectivity. It required a type of logical relationship with another person or persons. Subsequently, *parrhēsia* as a component of democratic society is concerned with the continuity between one's beliefs and the way one lives his or her life: between *bios* and *logos*.²⁷

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND HUMANISM: AGENCY AND SELF OVERCOMING

Foucault was criticized by critical theorists, such as Habermas who saw his work as negating human agency.²⁸ In some ways, the break between Foucault and critical theory has been overstated, as there is much continuity with the Frankfurt School,²⁹ for example, in the transformation and radicalization of Kant's approach to critique. This transformation sought to examine the impurity of what we call reason. Foucault and the Frankfurt School both saw reason as often inaccessible and imbedded within society, war, and culture.³⁰ In the break with Kant, both rejected the Cartesian notion of an autonomous rational subject.³¹ From both theoretical positions there is no good reason why knowledge and representation should enjoy privilege over values and norms.³²

Following from Descartes, thoughts utilized by the human sciences in nineteenth century institutions produced a social body often mediated through concepts of disorder and deviance, which, in turn, placed individuals in a new relation with themselves and others. Foucault traced how the human sciences function as a *political technology of the body*.³³ Subsequently, both Foucault and the Frankfurt School saw the human sciences in need of critique. Specifically, value claims within the human sciences must be treated with critical scrutiny, as these claims cannot be taken for granted.³⁴ In contrast with the Frankfurt School,

²⁶ Michel Foucault, "Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth," in *The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1 (New York: The New Press, 1997), 257.

²⁷ Foucault, *Fearless Speech*.

²⁸ Thomas McCarthy, "The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School," in *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 243–81.

²⁹ Ibid., 243.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 244.

³² Ibid.

³³ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

³⁴ David M. Jones and Stephen J. Ball, "Michel Foucault and the Discourse of Education," in *Critical Theory and Educational Research*, eds. Peter L. McLaren and James M. Giarelli (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 40.

Foucault held that research methodology needed to pursue the “end of man” and the humanist conceptions derived from the human sciences.³⁵ This is where a primary departure occurred that distinguishes the two approaches to critical engagement.

Foucault saw post-World War II critical theory as dominated by the philosophy of the subject.³⁶ Both critical theory and genealogy as methodologies can be viewed as seeking to disrupt the subject-centeredness of modern Western thought. However, Foucault sought to abandon humanist conceptions of man, whereas critical theorists attempted to reconstruct notions of subjectivity and autonomy consistent with social dimensions of individual identity.³⁷ In Foucault’s view, subjectivity was a strategy of power that required individuals to constitute themselves as “subjects.”³⁸

According to Foucault, humanism was a theme or a set of themes appearing on several occasions over time in Western society.³⁹ These were themes that were tied to value judgments and varied greatly in terms of their content as well as how values were perceived over time. The Enlightenment was something different. Foucault saw the enlightenment as an event or set of events that occurred over time through a complex process within the development of Western societies. These included elements of social transformation, political institutions, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological mutations, and so forth. Foucault noted that a critique of ourselves had to avoid facile confusions between humanism and enlightenment.⁴⁰ It must involve a shift in forms of reflection.

Humanism since the 17th century has always consisted of concepts borrowed from religion, science, and politics. In the process, humanism has colored and justified the conceptions of man to which it is obliged to take recourse. Humanism, therefore, cannot provide the basis for principles upon which critique and an autonomous creation of ourselves can exist. Foucault noted that in the 19th-century there was a suspicious humanism critical toward science and another that placed its hope in science. He revealed that in Marxism, existentialism, and personalism there had been humanism. Humanistic values have been represented by National Socialism, and Stalinists also referred to themselves as humanists.⁴¹ This did not, however, lead Foucault to reject the complete domain of humanistic values. He argued that we should not “conclude

³⁵ McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason,” 248.

³⁶ Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth,” *Political Theory* 21, no. 2 (1993): 201.

³⁷ McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason,” 248.

³⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2008).

³⁹ Note the essay “What is Enlightenment,” in “Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth,” 313.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

that everything which has ever been linked with humanism is to be rejected, but that the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, and too inconsistent to serve as an axis of reflection.”⁴²

The Enlightenment or post-Enlightenment modernity might have been considered humanist. Foucault, however, saw the Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity.⁴³ If the Kantian question was to know the limits of knowledge, the critical question must be preserved; yet, it must be positive where criticism is no longer searching for formal structures for ethics or universal values. We need a historical investigation of the events that led us to constitute ourselves, that is, to recognize ourselves as subjects related to what we do, think, and say.⁴⁴

THE HUMAN SUBJECT: THE LIMITS OF EXPERIENCE

The lectures on *parrhēsia* can be situated as an attempt to foster a critical approach to subjectivity. Rather than human liberation, for Foucault, the best we can hope for is a political structure that involves more ethically engaged individuals who are cognizant of and increasingly removed from modes of subjectivity. Foucault rejected empty notions of liberation and empowerment offering simplistic solutions, dogmatic beliefs and exaggerated dichotomies. Overly simplified dichotomies include those between oppressors and oppressed, victims and persecutors, or characteristically dominant and subordinate identities. This approach to critical inquiry often relies on *naïve* populism and visions of an ideal society. *Parrhēsia*, on the contrary, involves a set of exercises related to one’s self, and therefore a means to critically examine subjectivities.⁴⁵

Three modes of subjectivity are directly relevant to understanding Foucault’s work and its connection to a critique and reconsideration of research. The first mode *dividing practices* relates to differentiation and categorization of human beings. The second mode *scientific classification* demonstrates, for example, how the discourses of life, language, or labor become structured into a discipline and achieve autonomy and coherence. It is concerned with how discursive formations achieve scientific status, and how disciplines inform political/social domains. The third mode is what Dreyfus and Rabinow call “subjectification.”⁴⁶ They draw this characterization from Foucault’s examination of the modes by which human beings are turned into objectified subjects. They interpret subjectification as more of a “self-formation” in which the individual is active. According to Foucault, it consists of a long, intricate series of “operations on [people’s] own bodies, on their own souls, on their own

⁴² Ibid., 314.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 315.

⁴⁵ Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, 309.

⁴⁶ Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

thoughts, on their own conduct.”⁴⁷ There is always a component of external authority involved in this process of self-understanding and self-formation. This is significant to modes of research which view various behaviors through paradigms of normality/abnormality internal and inherent to one’s self.

Subjectification also relates to “normalizing technologies.”⁴⁸ This conception examines specific institutional models used to situate and correct what is identified as abnormal or deviant. These models and the technologies they employ do not remain autonomous and unique unto themselves. Rather, the associated disciplines seek to reinforce and expand the scope of their work and realm of their inquiry. Normalizing technologies are inherently linked to the human sciences. Dreyfus and Rabinow distinguish between natural and human sciences this way: “a major difference between the operation of normal science and that of normalizing technologies; whereas normal science aims in principle at the final assimilation of all anomalies, disciplinary technology works to set up and preserve an increasingly differentiated set of anomalies, which is the very way it extends its knowledge and power into wider and wider domains.”⁴⁹

Parrhēsia serves as a mode to engage subjectivity and involves interrogation of self-understanding.⁵⁰ As a research framework, it offers the potential for a critical engagement of modes of subjectification. In relation to Foucault’s earlier work, the individual’s subjectivity is part of a historically identifiable system of thought placed within an intersection of discourse, schemas of human nature, and ontological beliefs.⁵¹ The function of this arrangement is often a modification of the subject’s relation to knowledge and a meaning guided by a predetermined set of techniques that exist prior to experience.⁵² The specific role of research, in general and in educational research, is to create the relationships in which knowledge is generated and disseminated. The approach to deconstructing these formations is difficult because the knowledge produced does not remain fixed and does not function solely in the objects it constructs.⁵³

⁴⁷ Michel Foucault, quoted in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 11.

⁴⁸ Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 198.

⁵⁰ Foucault, “Hermeneutics of the Self,” 203.

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

⁵² Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*.

⁵³ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 32. Foucault suggests, “...the problem arises of knowledge whether the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are continually transformed.”

Understanding our knowledges, institutions, and values requires self-examination of the underlying beliefs and actions.⁵⁴ It entails working within the broader spectrum of a social understanding. Educational researchers should be concerned less with a cohesive set of philosophical axioms and more with a dynamic system of open exchange. To understand the self's relation to the broader realm of history, culture, and society demands a more speculative philosophy, one that does not position the individual as both subject and object.⁵⁵ It calls for considering multiple perspectives and walking across disciplinary (paradigmatic) boundaries.

Parrhēsia is associated with discourse, which is different than the pure exercise of power.⁵⁶ In time, there was a pedagogic component—it is only through education that one develops the capacity for parrhēsia. It was philosophy and paideia (training, culture, education) and the interrelated function of doctrine (logos) and life (bios) that led to social acceptance.⁵⁷ It connected *care of the self*, which generally has a pedagogic component, to ontological harmony (logos & bios).⁵⁸ The pedagogic aspects of parrhēsia required the right type of education, one of *praxis* (knowledge and practice). Education and parrhēsia therefore, are conspicuously linked. Furthermore, parrhēsia as a *techne* is a particular knowledge that takes shape in practice through theoretical knowledge and exercise. However, parrhēsia like *phronēsis* is beyond techne in that it requires reflection and a connection to a life well lived.

Parrhēsia evolved over time to include a prophetic verdict, the verdict of wisdom (sage), and the technical verdict of teaching.⁵⁹ This connected parrhēsia to technical knowledge focused on education. The question then became how to teach virtue and the knowledge essential for a life well lived and for society to function properly. Foucault linked Socrates to a “truly ethical” parrhēsia, as it was most directly concerned with the mode of life.⁶⁰ In addition to the mode of life, Foucault noted the conditions by which individuals were “capable of truth” in relation to knowledge. He acknowledged that there were also cultural conditions, in which after Descartes, according to Foucault,

On the one hand, there are the internal conditions of the act of knowledge and of the rules it must obey to have access to the truth: formal conditions, objective conditions, formal rules of method, the structure of the object to be known. . . . the

⁵⁴ These themes are developed further in Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy: And, the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor Books, 1990).

⁵⁵ Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*.

⁵⁶ Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, 104.

⁵⁷ Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, 61.

⁵⁸ Foucault, *Fearless Speech*.

⁵⁹ Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, 27.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 149.

conditions of the subject's access to the truth are defined within knowledge. The other conditions are extrinsic. . . . And there are moral conditions: to know the truth we must make an effort, we must not seek to deceive our world, and the interests of financial reward, career, and status must be combined in a way that is fully compatible with the norms of disinterested research, etcetera. As you can see, these are all conditions that are either intrinsic to knowledge or extrinsic to the act of knowledge, but which do not concern the subject in his being; they only concern the individual in his concrete existence, and not the structure of the subject as such.⁶¹

In our contemporary context we can identify the norms of disinterested research and explore the reliance on the conditions of knowledge, while negating the structure of the subject in the elevation of procedural ethics (i.e., adherence to a set of rules) over *ethics in practice*. Ethics in practice relate to the ethical issues and tensions that arise in the context of research and the complex ethical dilemmas that are encountered when interacting with human “subjects.”⁶² When ethics in practice are subordinated to proceduralization, then superficiality and simplification dominate educational research in general, and methodology specifically.⁶³ Ethics in practice are process oriented and should be conceived as central to research as a whole. Ethics in practice require ontological harmony, a continuity between our ethics and our conduct cultivated over time and in relation to others. Truth-telling, ethics, and values are entwined and need to be critically reflected within the complexity (messiness) of our methodological choices and dilemmas.⁶⁴

Educational researchers often work under conditions rife with tensions, bifurcations, and confusions that, in turn, offer possibilities to problematize our practices.⁶⁵ Embracing these possibilities requires new critical dispositions that allow us to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, and saying.⁶⁶ This is a practice central to *parrhēsia*, one that involves frankness, boldness, and risk-taking—forms of expression that avoid “any kind of rhetorical form.”⁶⁷

⁶¹ Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 18.

⁶² Marilys Guillemin and Lynn Gillam, “Ethics, Reflexivity, and ‘Ethically Important Moments’ in Research,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (2004): 264.

⁶³ Kuntz, *The Responsible Methodologist*; Mirka Koro-Ljungberg, “Researchers of the World, Create!,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 18, no. 9 (2012).

⁶⁴ M. Carolyn Clark and Barbara F. Sharf, “The Dark Side of Truth(s): Ethical Dilemmas in Researching the Personal,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 13, no. 3 (2007).

⁶⁵ Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005).

⁶⁶ Dimitriadis, *Critical Dispositions*.

⁶⁷ Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, 12.

CONCLUSION

Foucault is not seeking a complete rejection of enlightenment values, but rather “moving beyond the outside inside alternative,”⁶⁸ in other words, not being held hostage to the idea that criticism of humanism and Enlightenment values is a complete rejection of modernity. His lectures on *parrhēsia* can be understood as an attempt to recuperate the critical tradition from the Enlightenment while engaging the ethical domains related to the modern human subject.

Understanding the modern interplay between knowledge and experience involves illumination of ontological positions and epistemological frameworks that are simultaneously conceptualized as universal and particular through modes of representation and subjectivity. The didactics and potential of *parrhēsia*, as with *praxis* and *phronēsis*, orientate truth toward a dialogical process.⁶⁹

A critical approach to educational research informed by *parrhēsia* offers the potential to examine the tensions between meaning, subjectivity, and the self. It would be relational and oriented toward overcoming subjectivity.⁷⁰ *Parrhēsia* as an ethical practice offers a space between more general beliefs and underlying assumptions relevant to examining one’s subjectivity.⁷¹ As an approach to research, it situates individuals within the formation and evaluation of meaning and knowledge, as opposed to isolating and abstracting them from it.⁷² It is essential that educational researchers move beyond procedural ethics to engage in research as an ethical practice. This orientation is especially critical in preparing future educational scholars and practitioners. *Parrhēsia* enables educational researchers to resist the notion of “expertise,” and facilitates the development of critical, reflexive, and relational practices.

In this paper, we explored the relation between the concepts of *parrhēsia*, humanism, subjectivity, and ethics in educational research. Within our examination, at the point of intersection are critical engagement and dialogical ethics, which require “openness towards the other, being open to different perspectives and to ways of acting which challenge the prevailing forms.”⁷³ As

⁶⁸ From the essay “What is Enlightenment,” in “Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth,” 315.

⁶⁹ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 291. Arendt notes that Plato and Aristotle “considered this dialogical thought process to be the way to prepare the soul and lead the mind to a beholding of truth beyond thought and beyond speech—a truth that is *arrhēton*, incapable of being communicated through words, as Plato put it, or beyond speech as in Aristotle.”

⁷⁰ Foucault, *The Punitive Society*.

⁷¹ This is consistent with *techne* and *phronēsis* outlined by Joseph Dunne, *Back to the Rough Ground: “Phronesis” and “Techne” in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle*, reprint (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Christopher Falzon, *Foucault and Social Dialogue: Beyond Fragmentation* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 6.

we shared in the introduction, we hope that our thoughts contribute to ongoing discussions to critique “normalizing rationales,” and to developing critical dispositions.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Dimitriadis, *Critical Dispositions*.